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Abstract 
The question addressed in this paper is how to explain the dramatic rise of Pim 
Fortuyn's right-wing populist party during the campaign for the parliamentary 
elections in the Netherlands in 2002. Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the 
most media attention of all political actors and his new party won 17 percent of 
the votes. We analyze how this new populist party managed to mobilize such an 
amount of attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. We use the notion of 
“discursive opportunities” and argue that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and 
his party played a decisive role for his ability to further diffuse his claims in the 
public sphere and to achieve support among the Dutch electorate. The 
predictions of the effects of discursive opportunities are empirically investigated 
with longitudinal data from newspapers and opinion polls. To study these 
dynamics of the competition over voters’ support and over space in the public 
debate during the election campaign, we use an ARIMA time-series model as 
well as a negative binomial event count model with lagged variables to account 
for the time-series structure of the data. We find that discursive opportunities 
have significantly affected the degree to which Fortuyn was successful in the 
competition for both voter support, and media attention. Public visibility, 
resonance and legitimacy in the media significantly affected the opinion polls and 
higher degrees of legitimacy and negative claims on the issue of immigration and 
integration in the media by others increased the opportunities for Fortuyn to 
further diffuse his viewpoints and to become the main political opinion-maker 
during the turbulent election campaign of 2002. 
 Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Papier geht der Frage nach, wie sich der dramatische 
Aufschwung der rechtspopulistischen Partei Pim Fortuyns während des Wahl-
kampfs zu den niederländischen Parlamentswahlen 2002 erklären lässt. Pim 
Fortuyn gelang es, verglichen mit den anderen politischen Akteuren die weitaus 
größte Aufmerksamkeit der Medien auf sich zu lenken, und seine Partei gewann 
auf Anhieb 17 Prozent der Stimmen. Die Autoren untersuchen, wie es dieser 
neuen populistischen Partei gelingen konnte, so plötzlich und schnell ein solches 
Maß an Aufmerksamkeit und Unterstützung zu mobilisieren. Unter Verwendung 
des Begriffes „diskursiver Gelegenheiten“  wird argumentiert, dass die öffent-
lichen Reaktionen auf Pim Fortuyn und seine Partei entscheidend dazu 
beitrugen, dass er seine Forderungen in der Öffentlichkeit weiter verbreiten und 
Unterstützung unter den niederländischen Wählern finden konnte. Die vorherge-
sagten Effekte der diskursiven Gelegenheiten werden empirisch mit Längs-
schnittdaten aus Zeitungen und Meinungsumfragen untersucht. Die Analyse der 
Dynamik des Wettbewerbs um die Gunst der Wähler und um öffentliche 
Aufmerksamkeit in den Debatten erfolgt mittels eines ARIMA Zeitreihenmodells 
und eines negativen binomialen event count Modells mit zeitversetzten 
Variablen, um die Zeitreihenstruktur der Daten angemessen zu berücksichtigen. 
Die Autoren stellen fest, dass der Erfolg von Fortuyn im Wettbewerb um sowohl 
Wählerunterstützung als auch Medienaufmerksamkeit signifikant von diskursiven 
Gelegenheiten beeinflusst wird. Öffentliche Sichtbarkeit, Resonanz und Legiti-
mität in den Medien übten einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Meinungsumfragen 
aus. Ein höheres Maß an Legitimität und eine größere Zahl von negativen 
Forderungen zum Thema Immigration und Integration, die von anderen in die 
Medien getragen wurden, erhöhten für Fortuyn die Gelegenheiten, seine Ansich-
ten zu verbreiten und im Verlaufe des turbulenten Wahlkampfs 2002 zum 
wichtigsten politischen Meinungsmacher aufzusteigen.  
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 Introduction 
Until 2002, anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands had failed to make any 
significant impact on Dutch elections. The stunning success of right-wing populist 
Pim Fortuyn in the Dutch elections of May 2002 therefore constitutes a 
remarkable deviation from the traditionally low scores of radical right parties in 
this country. In the parliamentary elections of 1998, the radical right party Centre 
Democrats (CD) of Hans Janmaat did not receive any votes and lost the meagre 
three seats they had achieved in 1994. Only a few years later the dramatic rise of 
Pim Fortuyn broke records in Dutch and European political history. The List Pim 
Fortuyn (hereafter: LPF) won 26 seats, achieving by far the most impressive 
result ever for a new party in Dutch national elections. Also, the parties of the 
incumbent government coalition suffered an unprecedented defeat (Van Holsteyn 
& Irwin 2003). Such a high percentage (30.7 per cent) of aggregated electoral 
gains and losses of parties was without precedent (Van Praag 2003). The 
elections were also very exceptional in an international perspective. They are 
among the four most volatile elections of all 390 national elections in Western 
Europe since 1900 (Mair 2002). The breakthrough of the LPF was also 
remarkable with regard to the role of the media. Newcomer Pim Fortuyn was the 
most often mentioned politician in the media during the election campaign. More 
strikingly even, he got 24 per cent of all attention, which is the same amount as 
the politicians on the second, third, fourth, and fifth positions taken together 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003).   
The central question of this paper is how to explain this striking outcome: what 
are the causes of the rise of Pim Fortuyn and his political party? For a 
satisfactory answer to questions about this sudden political change, the public 
opinion as well as the debate in the media should be taken into account. To date, 
scholars who use a discursive opportunity approach have mainly focused on 
opinions and claims expressed in the public debate (e.g. Ferree et al. 2002; 
Koopmans & Olzak 2004). This study pursues to enlarge the scope of these 
studies by also taking the general public opinion as measured by opinion polls 
into account. It goes without saying that the aggregated public opinion is not 
necessarily identical to the aggregated publicized opinion in the media. 
Therefore, our analysis of the rise of Fortuyn will refer to two elements. First, we 
look at his success in the public opinion, as expressed by the amount of people 
who said they intended to vote for this new anti-immigration party in opinion polls. 
Secondly, we analyse the public claims made by Fortuyn and his party, which 
indicates the extent to which he was able to publicly express his opinions and 
viewpoints in the media. Our central argument is that, in combination with the 
electoral potential and the political space available, discursive opportunities help 
explain both the increase in public claim making of Pim Fortuyn and the electoral 
success of his LPF.  
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Much of the previous academic work on the rise of anti-immigration parties has 
tended to focus on the structural conditions that have facilitated the emergence 
or ‘breakthrough’ of radical-right parties. It has focused on two main sets of 
factors: demand-side and supply-side (for a review of recent work, see Van der 
Brug & Fennema 2007). The former refer to the conditions that have created a 
social and cultural “reservoir” to be exploited by far-right political parties, such as 
value change and structural cleavages related to the modernization process (e.g. 
Betz 1994; Eatwell 2000; Ignazi 2003). Supply-side factors include political and 
institutional aspects, which social movement scholars have labelled as "political 
opportunity structures," such as the structure of the electoral system, the 
responses of established actors, and the dynamics of party alignment, 
demarcation, and competition (e.g., Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Koopmans et al. 
2005). These political opportunity structures provide the radical right with a 
political niche to be exploited.  
We agree that these two sets of necessary conditions or facilitating factors are 
relevant and important if one studies the breakthrough of anti-immigration parties 
and populist right-wing mobilisation like the rise of the LPF in the Netherlands. 
However, we do not think that the answer to the question how it was possible that 
the public opinion and media debate could change so dramatically within such a 
short time span can be found in comparatively slow political and institutional 
changes or value shifts in the electorate (see likewise Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 
14). Of course, structural and political conditions are important to explain why 
certain changes are possible or likely. But to understand these short-term 
changes it is more useful to look at a factor that can, first of all, change within 
short periods of time, and second, that is visible for people: the public debate in 
the media.  In the absence of fertile structural conditions and attendant 
grievances, political entrepreneurs will not be able to successfully mobilize public 
support. But such grievances, we argue, are to an important extent amplified and 
to some extent even generated within the public discourse.  
We want to avoid the shortcoming of only focussing on the demand-side or on 
structural political opportunities by building on theories on social movements and 
media influence that emphasize how public discourse provides opportunities for 
mobilization. The public sphere is where political parties or social movements can 
test the efficacy of different mobilization strategies, and where opportunities and 
constraints become visible by way of the public actions and reactions of other 
actors. To capture this role of the public sphere, scholars have developed the 
notion of discursive opportunities (Ferree et al. 2002; Ferree 2003; Koopmans & 
Olzak 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). Following this theoretical lead, we will show 
that the key to understanding the success of Fortuyn lies in the dynamics of the 
public debate, and particularly in the ways in which other actors reacted to his 
claims. 
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Theoretical Perspectives 
Demand-side explanations: socio-economic conditions and grievances  
A classic example of the demand-side approach is The American Voter 
(Campbell et al. 1980[1960]). The key point of the authors is that someone’s 
socio-economic background will be translated into a political orientation. 
Concerning the ultimate reasons for shifts in voting behaviour, it implies that we 
should look for long-term structural changes. According to this view, the electoral 
revolt of 2002 must somehow have found its root in increasing feelings of 
discontent among the population.  
A familiar argument holds that worsening economic conditions increase 
dissatisfaction with an incumbent government. But in view of the socioeconomic 
situation in the Netherlands in 2001, the claim that the rise of Fortuyn was a 
result of the country’s economic performance is not convincing. According to a 
survey by The Economist, the Dutch economy was at the time remarkably 
healthy and experienced an impressive growth under the incumbent 
government.1 The unemployment rate was 6.6 per cent in 1990 (a moderate level 
compared to other countries of the European Union) and declined during the 
nineties to 3.5 per cent in 2000, a considerably lower rate than in most other EU 
member countries (CPB 2001). 
A more convincing demand-side explanation is that immigration and cultural 
diversity resulted in a new cleavage. Theories of “ethnic competition” state that 
support for radical- right parties is generated by an increased sense of threat by 
immigrants (Scheepers et al. 2002). In this view, a high influx of immigrants may 
increase subjective perceptions of increased ethnic competition (even if 
perceptions are not justified) and people become receptive to ideologies and 
charismatic leaders who designate specific racial or ethnic minorities as 
responsible for social problems (Eatwell 2000: 415).  
Detailed investigations at the individual level seem to offer some support for 
ethnic competition accounts. Voting decisions for the LPF were to an important 
extent based on the content of the political issues that the LPF advanced, most 
importantly its position on the issues of integration and immigration (Fennema & 
Van der Brug, 2006).  Fortuyn made it acceptable to publicly speak the previously 
unutterable and his viewpoints on the issues of immigration and integration 
tapped into the fears of ordinary Dutch people and matched their live experiences 
of minority-related crime and segregation in cities and schools. Fortuyn’s rhetoric, 
which largely focused on the number of immigrants in the country and their 
supposed lack of respect for the Dutch way of life, struck a chord with some 
sections of the population. 
                                                     
 1 The Economist, May 4, 2002 
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Table 1:  The opinion of the Dutch population on the multicultural society 
and the degree of satisfaction with the government (percentages, 
1997-2002) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
The influx of asylum seekers should…    
Be possible without restrictions 8 9 8 9 8 7 
Be restricted 73 76 75 75 76 77 
Be completely halted 19 15 17 16 17 16 
Dutch ethnic minorities should…    
Be able to maintain their own culture 4 4 3 3 3 2 
Be able to maintain their own culture to a 
large extent 7 8 7 7 6 5 
Neither maintain their own culture, nor 
adapt to Dutch culture 35 35 36 34 34 32 
Adapt to a large extent to Dutch culture 28 29 29 30 32 33 
Adapt completely to Dutch culture 26 24 25 26 25 28 
Amount of satisfaction with the government    
Very satisfied 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Satisfied 36 41 33 38 37 24 
Neither satisfied, nor unsatisfied 48 44 48 46 45 45 
Unsatisfied 13 11 15 13 14 24 
Very unsatisfied 2 2 3 2 2 6 
Source: CBS (2006) 
However, if we take a closer look at the perceived grievances, it appears that the 
opinions of the Dutch on the issue of the multicultural society and admittance of 
asylum seekers were rather stable during the late 1990s (see Table 1).2 The 
limited and very gradual increase in the number of people who felt that 
immigrants should adapt to Dutch culture (from 54 per cent in 1990 to 61 per cent 
in 2002) indicates that there was widespread support for a more assimilationist 
approach to integration policies long before the breakthrough of Fortuyn. The 
surge of the LPF in 2002 cannot be ascribed to a sudden change in the opinion 
climate on immigration and multiculturalism. Objective immigration figures do not 
suggest a link between the rise of the LPF and increased ethnic competition 
either. Data provided by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2007) show that the 
monthly numbers of people who migrated to the Netherlands were relatively 
stable during the 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 1). The numbers of refugees 
requesting for asylum even decreased from 52,580 in 1994 to 32,550 persons in 
2000. The number of accepted applications decreased as well.   
                                                     
 2 These figures are in line with similar stable findings presented by Fennema & Van der 
Brug (2006) on support for multiculturalism and Coenders et al. (2006) on support for 
ethnic discrimination. 
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Figure 1:  Monthly immigration figures in the Netherlands, 1990-2002 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Ja
n 
90
Ja
n 
91
Ja
n 
92
Ja
n 
93
Ja
n 
94
Ja
n 
95
Ja
n 
96
Ja
n 
97
Ja
n 
98
Ja
n 
99
Ja
n 
00
Ja
n 
01
Ja
n 
02
 
Source: CBS (2007). 
Table 1 above also shows that the amount of dissatisfaction with the incumbent 
government was stable until the year 2002, when Fortuyn's advance was already 
well underway. Because these are average yearly figures, it is not possible to 
precisely indicate when the clear shift in the degree of dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent government from 16 per cent in 2001 to 30 per cent in 2002 set in. It 
seems most likely that the rise of Fortuyn incited dissatisfaction, rather than the 
other way round (see also Van der Brug 2003).  
With the benefit of hindsight, the success of the LPF seems easy to understand 
in terms of an outburst of a long-existing but unnoticed stream of discontent with 
the official political myth that Dutch multicultural policies were a success. But the 
breakthrough calls for an explanation that goes beyond the socio-structural 
model of voting behaviour, since the social conditions and electoral preferences 
that supposedly caused the surge of an anti-immigration party did not vary much 
in time and hence cannot account for the success of Pim Fortuyn. A primarily 
socio-economic or ethnic competition approach has problems explaining sudden 
breakthroughs and electoral dynamics (Eatwell 1998; see also Norris 2005). A 
crucial weakness of theories about the ‘demand’ of voters is that they cannot deal 
with striking short-term fluctuations, and can only point towards necessary 
conditions that were met. Adriaansen et al. (2005) state that the potential 
electoral success for a party like the LPF already existed for at least eight years. 
Already in 1994 support for multiculturalism was weak and more than 60 per cent 
of the population held the opinion that minorities had to adapt to ‘Dutch culture’ 
(Adriaansen et al. 2005: 234). Coenders et al. (2006) and Scheepers et al. (2003) 
likewise point out that the Fortuynist potential had already been present many 
years before Pim Fortuyn entered the political stage. We have to conclude that 
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social-structural and grievance theories offer at best a partial explanation for the 
rise of Pim Fortuyn. 
Supply-side explanations: political opportunities 
The concept of political opportunity structure (e.g., McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; 
Kriesi et al. 1995) has gained widespread popularity in the literature on social 
movements. The basic idea is that the capacity to mobilize depends on 
opportunities and constraints offered by the political-institutional setting. 
Xenophobic and radical-right claim-making and success are affected by the 
institutional characteristics of a political system (e.g., its electoral system) and by 
dynamic aspects of the political process. As our case concerns developments 
over time within one polity, only the second set of factors seems relevant for the 
case at hand.  
An important aspect here is whether established parties, which are in electoral 
competition with radical-right parties, already occupy the electoral terrain of the 
radical right. The average position of established parties and the political space 
they leave to radical-right actors affects the openness of a political system to new 
anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Van der Brug et al. 2005; 
Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Koopmans et al. (2005) argued on the basis of data 
for the 1990s that in the Netherlands there was a moderate potential for the 
emergence of a radical-right party because established left and right parties 
occupied positions relatively close to one another on immigration and integration 
issues, leaving a space on the right that could potentially be exploited by an anti-
immigrant party. Several other authors have also pointed to the favourable 
opportunity structure because of the ideological position of the mainstream right 
party, the conservative-liberal VVD, which left a gap on the right end of the 
electoral spectrum that the newcomer LPF could profit from. The "purple 
government," which brought together the social-democratic left (PvdA) and 
liberal-right (VVD) in one consensus-based coalition increased convergence in 
mainstream party positions (Pellikaan et al. 2003; Pennings & Keman 2003; Van 
Holsteyn & Irwin 2003, Van Holsteyn et al. 2003).  
The role of the public debate: Discursive opportunities 
Critics of political opportunity structure theory have correctly pointed out that a 
factor such as “political space” has no meaning if people do not become aware of 
it. Such awareness must arise on the basis of information that becomes publicly 
available, and the statements and actions of elite actors that are visible to the 
public. Theories of "discursive opportunities" aim to address this question how 
structurally given political opportunities become publicly visible.  
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This argument starts from the assumption that the public sphere is a bounded 
space for political communication characterized by a high level of competition 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Just as protests that receive no media coverage at 
all are in the words of Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993: 116) “nonevents,” regime 
weaknesses and openings that do not become publicly visible may be considered 
“non-opportunities,” which for all practical intents and purposes might as well not 
exist at all. Only a minority of all attempts at public claims-making receive the 
media attention that is necessary to reach wider audiences. We define discursive 
opportunities as the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's 
chances of success in the public sphere (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans & Olzak 
2004).  
From communications and media research we know that “news values” of 
journalists shape decisions that make a given story newsworthy (Galtung & Ruge 
1965; Harcup & O’Neill 2001). The actions of gatekeepers produce the first and 
most basic type of discursive opportunity that we can distinguish: visibility. 
Visibility depends on the number of communicative channels by which a 
message is included and the prominence of such inclusion. Visibility is a 
necessary condition for a message to influence the public discourse, and, other 
things being equal, the amount of visibility that gatekeepers allocate to a 
message increases its potential to diffuse further in the public sphere (Koopmans 
2004; Koopmans & Olzak 2004)  
We envision the communication environment of any particular public actor as the 
source of two further types of discursive opportunity: resonance and legitimacy. 
We do not only focus on Pim Fortuyn’s own discursive mobilization strategies, but 
also on the (largely strategically unanticipated) reactions that the emergence of 
Fortuyn and his party met with in the public debate. Political newcomers are likely 
to remain stillborn if they do not succeed in provoking reactions from other actors 
in the public sphere. The degree to which an actor and his messages provoke 
such reactions we refer to as resonance. Messages that resonate, whether 
negatively or positively, become in the eyes of journalists and editors more 
relevant and the actors behind them more "prominent," which increases the 
speaker’s chances to gain more space for his or her opinions.  
Following the dictum “any publicity is good publicity” it may to some extent not 
matter whether reactions are supportive or critical, but in other respects it is also 
likely to be relevant what the balance is between negative and positive 
responses. The balance between negative and positive reactions we call 
legitimacy. It is defined as the degree to which, on average, reactions by third 
actors support an actor or her claims more than they reject them. Defined in this 
way, legitimacy can vary independently of resonance. Highly legitimate 
messages may have no resonance at all because they are uncontroversial, while 
highly controversial messages may have strong resonance (e.g. Fortuyn's 
statements about the "backwardness" of Islamic culture).  
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We extend the above arguments by hypothesizing that visibility, resonance, and 
legitimacy will not only improve the opportunities for an actor to further increase 
the frequency of his publicly visible claims, but also help improve an actor's 
support in opinion polls. We claim that actors that receive prominent media 
attention (visibility), which draw many reactions from other political actors 
(resonance), and which receive more support than criticism (legitimacy) will be 
more successful in mobilizing voter support.  
The effects of legitimacy are potentially ambiguous. One might expect legitimacy 
to have a positive effect on the public opinion and space for similar subsequent 
messages, because legitimacy signals agreement with a party’s position. 
However, highly legitimate statements often provoke few reactions from other 
actors, i.e. they have low resonance, which may in turn reduce an actor's 
opportunities to mobilize media attention and electoral support. However, for a 
new anti-immigration party, we assume that gaining legitimacy in the public 
sphere might be more important than seeking to attract more attention by 
formulating controversial statements. According to Fennema & Van der Brug 
(2006), one of the main reasons that the earlier radical-right party of Hans 
Janmaat failed was that the message of the former had been widely and 
consequently delegitimized and considered “politically incorrect” by all other 
actors in the public debate.  
Research Design: Data and Variables 
To obtain data on the discursive opportunity variables and the claim making of 
Fortuyn, we used content analysis. Data were retrieved from articles in two 
national newspapers, the liberal NRC Handelsblad and the conservative 
Telegraaf (using the Lexis Nexis data base) from August 2001 until the day of the 
murder of Pim Fortuyn, May 6th 2002. The public debate will be limited to the 
written press. We will use political claims analysis (hereafter: PCA), which finds 
its origin in the field of social movement research (Koopmans et al. 2005: 23-27). 
It quantifies both contentious and conventional forms of political action and at the 
same time grasps the discursive elements of claims (see also Koopmans & 
Statham 1999).  
A claim is defined as “a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists 
of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, 
proposals, criticism, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the 
interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et 
al. 2005: 24). A typical claim consists of an actor (the subject) undertaking some 
sort of strategic political action to get another actor, the addressee, to do 
something regarding a third actor, the object. Claims must be the result of 
purposive action and political in nature. Examples of coded claims are "Prime 
Minister Balkenende rejects the principles of multiculturalism and thinks a civics 
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course should become compulsory," or "Hans Wiegel [ex-leader of the VVD] 
blames Fortuyn for being a populist and states that Fortuyn`s ideas are built on 
quicksand. He summons Dijkstal [the current VVD leader] to finally address 
Fortuyn."  
The temporal frame of our analysis runs from the third week of August 2001 – 
when Fortuyn announced his entry into politics – through the first week of May 
2002 – just before the murder of Fortuyn. The scores of the ‘media variables’ are 
aggregated, resulting in weekly scores. This implies that the unit of analysis (a 
‘case’) is not only a certain amount of claims or certain characteristics of a claim 
but a combination of time and score. In this analysis, the order of the observation 
is as important as the observation itself (in contrast with common cross-sectional 
analyses). The time sequence is a critical element in determining causation and 
crucial to analyze changes.   
Dependent variables 
The amount of public claims making by Fortuyn: the weekly count of the number 
of claims made by Fortuyn and his party.  
The public opinion on Fortuyn: For the measurement of the Fortuyn’s success in 
mobilizing the support in public opinion, we use data gathered by the polling 
agency Interview/NSS. Their Political Barometer measures levels of support for 
the various parties for each week during the period under investigation. The 
political barometer gives a reliable and valid picture of the amount of support 
among the Dutch population for all political parties. The results of these polls are 
reported every Friday, and therefore we have chosen Saturdays as the 
demarcation line between weeks, our units of observation. Support for Fortuyn is 
measured by the percentage of people that reported the intention to vote for 
Leefbaar Nederland (“Liveable Netherlands”, hereafter LN) or the LPF when 
asked for their party choice if parliamentary elections would be held the next day.  
At the end of August 2001, Fortuyn announced his intention to join a political 
party and enter the political arena, most likely with the LN party. We will consider 
a (intended) vote for LN as support for Fortuyn from that moment on. In the 
second week of February 2002, Fortuyn was forced to step down as party leader 
of LN after an interview in the Volkskrant in which he called Islam a “backward” 
religion. Immediately after Fortuyn’s ejection from LN, many commentators 
thought that Fortuyn’s short political career was over. However, Fortuyn founded 
his own party (the LPF) two days later. We will still consider a (intended) vote for 
both the LN and LPF as support for Fortuyn during the three weeks after these 
events, in particular because Fortuyn remained the party leader of Leefbaar 
Rotterdam (the local branch of LN) for the elections for municipal councils that 
were held on May 6. Thus, for many voters it may have been unclear during this 
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period whether or not Fortuyn was still associated with LN. After the municipal 
elections, only the support for the LPF was included in the dependent variable.3  
Independent variables 
Discursive opportunities are measured by (1) the amount of visibility in the media, 
(2) the amount of resonance in the media, and (3) the amount of legitimacy in the 
media. 
Visibility is defined as the extent to which the claims made by Fortuyn are visible 
in the newspapers. Our measure of visibility distinguishes claims that were 
reported prominently from those that were reported less prominently. We 
combine different elements of prominence into a composite indicator: 1) is the 
claim reported on the front page?; 2) is the claim the first claim mentioned in the 
article?; 3) is the claim referred to in the headline of the article?; 4) does the 
claim appear in both newspapers? 5) how many times is the claim repeated in 
follow-up articles?4 The variable consists of the summed score on each of the 
items and has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.67, which is evidence of a fair scale and 
indicates acceptable reliability.5 To avoid an overlap between the dependent and 
independent variable, the total amount of visibility in a week is divided by the 
number of claims made by Fortuyn. In other words, our visibility measure 
indicates the average visibility of the claims made by Fortuyn in a given week.    
Resonance is measured by counting the number of reactions by other actors to 
Fortuyn. This can also be an indirect reaction, for instance, when someone urges 
the leader of the Social-Democratic party to take a stronger stance against the 
viewpoints of Fortuyn. All instances of claim making that are directed to or 
referring to Fortuyn and his political party are included.  
Legitimacy is measured by coding the extent to which Fortuyn and his party are 
supported or criticized. The indicator scores the average tone across all claims 
referring to Pim Fortuyn. We computed the average position of all reactions on a 
                                                     
 3 We performed our analyses also including a dummy variable for the three weeks after 
the resignation of Fortuyn as leader of LN and until the municipal elections, in order to 
check whether our decision on how to deal with this confusing period had affected our 
results. The results are however very similar and the dummy variable is not signi-
ficant.  
 4 The rate of repetition was logged. It is measured independently of resonance be-
cause repetitions that occurred in the context of direct reactions to Fortuyn's state-
ments were excluded.  
 5 We additionally considered the item "is there a photograph illustrating the claim?", 
which was however removed from the scale because it correlated very poorly with 
other items and thus seems to refer to a different dimension of prominence.  
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scale ranging from -1 (negative reaction) to +1 (positive reaction). A zero was 
coded for claims that express an ambivalent or neutral position.6  
The amount of claims on immigration and integration. One of Fortuyn's unique 
selling points was his viewpoint on the issue of the multicultural society. It may 
have been the case that other actors have created further opportunities for claims 
making by Fortuyn by also making restrictive claims about immigration and 
integration. Alternatively, such claims may also have undermined Fortuyn's 
uniqueness in this regard and thereby have reduced his opportunities for further 
claims. For that reason, the number of negative claims on immigration or 
integration during a week will also be taken into account. To avoid confounding of 
independent and dependent variables, claims made by Fortuyn on this issue 
were excluded from this variable.  
The impact of 9/11. We use a dummy variable to capture the effect of a poten-
tially influential event that took place during the election campaign: the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11 (week no. 4 in our data). We ex-
plored both the temporary and the permanent effect of this event. The dummy 
variable applicable for an event with a temporal effect is set equal to 1 in that par-
ticular week. Modeling a permanent effect entails that the time period is divided 
into two parts: before (score 0) and after the event (score 1). 
Unemployment and immigration. Data with regard to unemployment and 
immigration were retrieved from the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2006; 
2008).7 Because these are monthly figures, an intrapolation procedure was 
carried out to create weekly rates.  
Analysis and Results 
Determinants of public opinion support for Fortuyn  
We will start with an analysis with support for Fortuyn in public opinion polls as 
the dependent variable. To estimate the effects of the media variables, immigra-
tion, unemployment and the attacks of September 11 on the public opinion during 
the election campaign, we use Box-Jenkins transfer modelling (see e.g. 
McCleary & Hay, 1980). A Box-Jenkins analysis can only proceed if all variables 
have stationary means and variances. The first step in order to derive an ARIMA-
                                                     
 6 A zero for the amount of legitimacy was also coded in those rare cases where there 
were no statements referring to Fortuyn or his party during a given week. 
 7 Instead of monthly immigration figures, we also considered the monthly influx of 
asylum seekers. However, asylum seeker numbers show a similar declining trend as 
the general immigration figures and using this variable instead of total immigration 
does not influence the results. 
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model is to check whether variables in the model have stationary means and 
variances. An inspection of the opinion poll series shows that the variance and 
mean of the time series increase as the level of the series increases, so the 
series has to be made stationary. This is also what a graph of the polls indicates 
(see Figure 2). The time series is made stationary by log-transformation and 
differencing. The explanatory variables are likewise inspected, and logged and 
differenced in case of non-stationarity.8 The most common unit-root test is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which shows that none of the variables contains a 
unit root (which implies that all series are now stationary).  
The second step is an inspection of the autocorrelation and partial auto-
correlation functions. These functions show a single spiking (and almost sig-
nificant) ACF at lag 1 and decaying PACF's, which indicates a moving average 
component with lag 1. A univariate ARIMA-model shows a significant coefficient 
for a moving average parameter at lag 1. The residuals are “white noise,” which 
means that there is no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. Similar “noise 
models” were developed for all independent variables in the analysis except for 
the dummy intervention variable.9  
Figure 2:  Percentage of voters intending to vote for Pim Fortuyn per week 
(August 2001 – May 2002) 
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Note: Week 1 starts 18 August, 2001 
Source: Interview/NSS  
                                                     
 8 In order to arrive at stationarity in both level and variance the following variables were 
transformed: visibility; unemployment (differenced); immigration and resonance 
(logged and differenced) and amount of negative claims on immigration/integration 
(logged).     
 9 See McCleary & Hay (1980: 243) for a good discussion why the relationship can only 
be interpreted when the cause variable is a white noise process.  
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Table 2: Determinants of public opinion support for Pim Fortuyn, 2001-2002 
 Model 1 
coefficient 
 
t-value 
Model 2 
coefficient 
 
t-value 
Moving average (t-1)     -0.47*** -3.21  -0.34* -1.98 
9/11(t-1)  0.07 0.38 -0.04 -0.23 
unemployment (t-1)  1.55 0.74  0.29  0.15 
immigration (t-1) -0.52 -0.45 -0.97 -1.00 
Visibility (t-1)         0.06***  2.89 
Resonance (t-2)       0.08**  2.39 
Legitimacy (t-2)       0.11**  2.06 
Negative claims immigration 
(t-1) 
   0.03  1.19 
     
RMS .040  .025  
AIC -10.98  -24.69  
N (weeks) 38  38  
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01   
Table 2 shows the results of the first model with the predicted impact of the 
attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the unemployment rate, and 
immigration. In this model it is assumed that 9/11 has a long-term (permanent) 
impact with a delay of one week and therefore the intervention is lagged one 
period. The interpretation of the transfer function depends on the fact that the 
variables are differenced. A shock has the effect of increasing the change in the 
dependent variable by a certain amount of units (Enders 2004: 257). However, 
the table shows that the intervention does not have a significant effect. An 
alternative model (not shown in the table) in which it is assumed that 9/11 only 
had a temporary effect leads to the same conclusion. We also have to conclude 
that unemployment and immigration have not affected the opinion polls during 
the election campaign. For immigration, this is hardly surprising since, as we 
indicated earlier, the rise of Pim Fortuyn occurred during a period when 
immigration figures had already been on the decline for about two years. 
Unemployment did increase slightly during the period of Fortuyn's rise, but on a 
very low level, from 3.5 per cent in August 2001 to 3.9 per cent in May 2002. 
In the second model in Table 2, the other explanatory variables are added. As 
expected, the public discourse has a significant influence on the polls. Visibility, 
resonance, as well as legitimacy have significant positive effects and lead to in-
creases in public opinion support for Fortuyn. The impact of the variables on the 
polls is lagged, and strongest at the first lag (for visibility) and the second lag (for 
resonance and legitimacy). This implies that efforts of other political actors to de-
legitimize Fortuyn by making negative claims about him or his party in the public 
sphere had an ambiguous impact. On the one hand, a lack of legitimacy under-
mined public opinion support for Fortuyn, as expressed in the weekly polls. But 
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on the other hand, because negative reactions added to the total number of reac-
tions to Fortuyn (resonance), such criticisms were partly also counterproductive.  
A change in the amount of negative claims on immigration or integration does not 
turn out to be significant, although the sign is in the expected direction This is 
consistent with several other studies that take the amount of media coverage into 
account (e.g. Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007; Walgrave & De Swert 2004), 
which show a positive influence of issue attention on anti-immigration party 
success. However, the study of Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) did not 
control for the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of Fortuyn’s claims. What our 
results suggest is that net of these effects of discursive opportunities, media 
attention for the issue of immigration was not a significant cause of Fortuyn’s 
success in the opinion polls.  
Not surprisingly, adding these variables increases the explanatory power of the 
model as indicated by the mean square root of the squared residuals summed 
over all time periods (RMS) - the standard goodness of fit measure in time-series 
analysis (Clarke et al. 1990). The RMS decreases from 0.040 to 0.025. The 
smaller the RMS, the smaller the error and the better the fit of the model. Also, a 
lower AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) points to a better fit of the model.10 
Determinants of Fortuyn’s claim-making success 
As our second dependent variable we now turn to the investigation of the rate of 
claim making by Fortuyn, i.e. the amount of successful attempts by Fortuyn to 
publicly air his position and viewpoints. Figure 3 shows the amount of claims 
made by Fortuyn in our two media sources for each week. This variable is an 
event count, which has the characteristic that its values are discrete and non-
negative. King (1989) explains why in that case an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) is inappropriate (King also presents a good discussion and 
application of event count data). 
In addition, we are confronted with overdispersion in the dependent variable, 
which means that we are more likely to see both a large number of lower counts 
and a number of very high counts, as is shown in Figure 4. Thirty per cent of the 
weeks have a zero score, which means that in these weeks Fortuyn was not able 
to insert any new claims in the public discourse. However, in overdispersed data 
there is positive contagion across events, and one count (observation) increases  
 
                                                     
 10 The Ljung-Box Q statistic, which tests the significance of autocorrelation at each lag 
(see e.g. Enders 2004) indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals for all 
models. Its significance value is less than or equal to 0.05 for 20 lags. 
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Figure 3:   Weekly count of the number of claims by Pim Fortuyn  
(August 2001 – May 2002) 
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Figure 4:  Density distribution of the weekly number of claims made  
by Pim Fortuyn  
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the likelihood of observing additional events in the same period.11 This positive 
contagion implies that we have more variability than for an independent Poisson 
process, and therefore we will use a negative binomial distribution for the 
dependent variable in our model instead (Long & Freese 2006). To model the 
time-series character of these event counts we include a lagged dependent 
variable event count as a regressor in the model. 
Table 3 shows the results of a negative binomial regression model with the 
number of claims by Fortuyn as the dependent variable. In the first model, only 
9/11 (with a long duration effect), unemployment, immigration and a first-order 
autoregression of the dependent variable are included. We find both an 
autoregressive effect and a strong relationship between a change in the 
unemployment rate and the amount of claims by Fortuyn in the subsequent 
week. 
Table 3:  Determinants of the rate of publicized claim making by Pim 
Fortuyn, 2001-2002 
 Model 1 
coefficient 
 
z-value 
Model 2 
coefficient 
 
z-value 
Claims Fortuyn (t-1)    0.07**   2.21 0.05   1.29 
9/11(t-1) 1.33   1.19 0.62   0.55 
Unemployment (t-1)     4.25**   2.20 1.74   0.76 
 Immigration (t-1)  0.00 -0.36 0.00   0.78 
Visibility (t-1)   0.07   0.46 
Resonance (t-1)   0.00 -0.11 
Legitimacy (t-1)       0.03**   2.25 
Negative claims immigration 
(t-1) 
      0.07**   2.46 
Opinion polls (t-1)       0.18**   2.57 
     
Constant -15.12* -1.75 -9.66 -1.10 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -72.18  -65.81  
Wald Chi-Square      28.37***       65.56***  
N (weeks) 38  38  
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01  
The second step is to investigate the effects of the discursive opportunity 
variables. In this second model, the amount of negative claims by other actors on 
immigration and integration, as well as support for Fortuyn in opinion polls are 
also included. The model fit statistics (Wald Chi square and log pseudo-likeli-
                                                     
 11 A good illustration of overdispersion because of positive contagion is counting 
antelopes. Since antelopes are herd animals, when you see one, you will probably 
observe some more. So counts of antelopes will probably violate the assumption that 
one event has no effect on the likelihood of observing additional events in the same 
period. 
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hood) point to a better model. After adding these variables, both the autoregres-
sive effect and the impact of unemployment are no longer significant. 
 It appears from our second model that a there is no relationship between the 
degree of visibility of the claims of Fortuyn and the number of public claims by 
Fortuyn one week later. Resonance does not show an effect either. Legitimacy, 
however, has a positive impact, as in the earlier analysis with opinion polls as the 
dependent variable. The more support for Fortuyn in the public debate, the more 
Fortuyn is able to express his position and viewpoints through the print media in 
the subsequent week. The results also show a positive influence of the number of 
negative immigration claims. This means that other actors have created further 
opportunities for claims making by Fortuyn by also making restrictive claims 
about immigration and integration. The analysis supports the expectation that 
restrictive claims on the immigration issue served as an additional opportunity for 
the political newcomer. The opinion polls also have a strong positive effect. The 
general conclusion is that approval (as indicated by opinion poll support from the 
general public and supportive statements by other actors in the media) enables a 
new political party to further make its standpoints known and heard in the public 
sphere.  
Summary and Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, we set out to examine the spectacular rise in the Netherlands of the 
new populist right party headed by the charismatic Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Pim 
Fortuyn´s party succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all 
parties and out of the blue won 17 per cent of the votes. Dissatisfaction with 
multicultural policies offered a fertile ground for a populist anti-immigration party. 
Fortuyn’s viewpoints on the issues of immigration and integration tapped into the 
fears of ordinary Dutch people and matched their lives experiences of minority-
related crime and segregation in cities and schools. But these socio-economic 
conditions and grievances cannot explain the explosive political career of 
Fortuyn. The immigration figures had been relatively stable during the 1990s and 
were declining since 2000, and the country’s economy was healthy. Research 
shows that long before the emergence of Fortuyn, there was an electoral 
potential for an anti-immigration party. 
The political opportunity structure perspective adds to our understanding of this 
potential for a radical-right party. One of the most relevant facilitating factors for 
the emergence of the radical right is the political space made available to it by the 
policy positions of mainstream parties. However, empirical evidence suggests 
that such an electoral niche had already been present much longer. During the 
election campaign of 1998 the Dutch political elite was still able to stick to its 
commitment to multiculturalism by mobilizing “political correctness” to dele-
gitimize the then active anti-immigration party. Like the grievance and ethnic 
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threat arguments, the political opportunity perspective is useful to identify the 
existence of an electoral potential, but it cannot explain why this potential lay 
fallow for so long and was then so suddenly and spectacularly seized upon by 
Pim Fortuyn. 
 We have advanced the argument that electoral potentials and political 
opportunities have to be made visible in the public discourse in order to become 
behaviourally relevant. We use the notion of “discursive opportunities” to capture 
the publicly visible opportunities and constraints for the claim-making behaviour 
of political parties. We have shown that indeed media attention for Pim Fortuyn 
and the public reactions to his party played a decisive role to explain the 
remarkable degree to which he was able to mobilize support and express his 
claims in the public sphere. Applying this perspective to the explanation of both 
support for Fortuyn in opinion polls and his claim-making success in the media, 
we showed that all three types of discursive opportunities that we distinguished – 
visibility, resonance and legitimacy – were relevant for understanding the rise of 
Pim Fortuyn and his party. 
Public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy in the media significantly affected the 
public opinion support for Fortuyn. Support by other actors in the public sphere 
was beneficial and criticism harmful for his position in the weekly polls. However, 
this is not to say that ventilating critical reactions in order to undermine the 
legitimacy of political opponents is always the best strategy in the competition for 
votes. Negative reactions to Fortuyn also served as an important indirect channel 
that, contrary to the intention of those who criticized Fortuyn, partly boosted 
popular support for him, by creating more resonance and visibility for his claims.  
With regard to Fortuyn’s own claim-making success, we found that an average 
positive tone among all claims referring to Fortuyn (a higher degree of legitimacy) 
significantly increased the rate at which Fortuyn was able to publicly air his 
positions and viewpoints. Reesonance and visibility did not have a direct impact 
on Fortuyn’s claim making, although they were relevant in an indirect sense by 
increasing his support in opinion polls. One of Fortuyn's unique selling points – 
his position on the issue of the multicultural society – was not undermined when 
other actors also made restrictive statements about immigration and integration. 
On the contrary, they created further opportunities for claims making by Fortuyn. 
The opinion polls also had strong positive effect: the more support for Fortuyn in 
the public opinion, the more space was given to Fortuyn to express his positions 
and viewpoints in the media.  
Combining the results for the two dependent variables, we can identify a dynamic 
feedback process in which the reactions by the media and by other politicians to 
Fortuyn (visibility, resonance, and legitimacy) raised Fortuyn’s popularity among 
the electorate. In turn, Fortuyn`s support in opinion polls, combined with direct 
support that he drew from other political actors and failed attempts by other 
politicians to steal his thunder by also making anti-immigrant claims, raised the 
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rate of claims by Fortuyn that made it into the media. When other political actors 
again reacted to Fortuyn’s increased public profile, and the media presented his 
claims more prominently, the spiral of discursive escalation was given a further 
swing and Fortuyn’s star rose yet further in the opinion polls. This process of 
multiple feedback explains why political relations that had been relatively stable, 
and an election campaign that was expected by most observers to become very 
dull suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium and gave rise to the greatest landslide in 
Dutch electoral history.12 We believe that the relevance of these findings and the 
theoretical perspective of discursive opportunities that accounts for them extend 
beyond the case of Pim Fortuyn and can add to a more general understanding of 
the dynamics of sudden political transformations, shifts, breakthroughs, and 
breakdowns.    
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